1 2 3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 6 AT SEATTLE 7 MICKEY VALCUE POLK, 8 Petitioner, CASE NO. C05-2003-JCC-MJB (CR93-271-JCC; CR93-515-JCC) 9 v. REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 10 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 11 Respondent. 12 **INTRODUCTION** 13 Petitioner is a federal prisoner who is currently confined at the FCI Victorville in 14 15 Adelanto, California. Petitioner has filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate, set aside, or correct his federal court sentence. The government has filed a response, raising 16 the statute of limitations as a bar to the Court's consideration of petitioner's motion. 17 Because the government is correct in its argument, petitioner's motion should be 18 19 dismissed as untimely. PROCEDURAL HISTORY¹ 20 In 1993, petitioner pleaded guilty on two different indictments, one filed in the 21 22 23 ¹The parties agree that the procedural history of this case is very confusing. (Dkt. #7 at 3, Govt's Response; Dkt. #10 at 1, Petitioner's Reply). Because this Court is recommending 24 dismissal on a statute of limitations basis, only the history relevant to that issue is set out here. 25 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 26 Page 1

26 F

Western District of Washington (CR-93-271-JCC, Dkt. #35), and one transferred from the Eastern District of California (CR-93-515-JCC; Dkt #3). The indictments separately charged petitioner with possession of cocaine base with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(A). On October 29, 1993, petitioner was sentenced to 262 months imprisonment in each of the two cases, those sentences to run consecutively. (CR-93-271-JCC, Dkt. # 40, 43; CR-93-515-JCC, Dkt. # 4). Petitioner did not file an appeal in either case. On December 12, 2005, petitioner filed the instant motion for relief under § 2255. The government filed a timely response to petitioner's motion on February 8, 2006, and, after receiving single extension of time, petitioner filed a reply.

DISCUSSION

Petitioner alleges in his § 2255 motion that his sentence was imposed in violation of his rights under the Sixth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments because the indictment failed to allege that he was a career offender. Petitioner seeks re-sentencing pursuant to *Blakely v. Washington*, 124 S.Ct. 2531 (2004)² and/or *United States v. Booker*, 125 S.Ct. 738 (2005).

In response, the government argues first that petitioner's motion is untimely and therefore barred from review. In addition, the government argues that petitioner's motion must be dismissed because: a) he has neither sought nor received permission from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals to file a successive petition; b) he has failed to show cause for his failure to raise his claims on direct appeal, and failed to establish prejudice; and c) his motion violates the rules governing § 2255 proceedings because it

²Although petitioner cites *Blakely*, that case applies only to the Washington state sentencing scheme, not the federal sentencing guidelines under which petitioner was sentenced.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

26 | Page 3

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is directed at two different judgments in one motion. For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds that the government's position on the timeliness question is correct, and the Court therefore does not address the government's alternative arguments.

Motions filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 are governed by the one-year statute of limitations provided in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"). This one-year statute of limitations begins to run from the latest of –

- (1) the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final;
- (2) the date on which the impediment to making a motion created by governmental action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the movant was prevented from making a motion by such governmental action;
- (3) the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or
- (4) the date on which the facts supporting the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.

28 U.S.C. § 2255.

Petitioner does not dispute that he filed the instant § 2255 motion more than one year after his convictions became final. Rather, he relies upon subsection (3) of this statute, which is effectively an exception to the general one-year limit set forth in subsection (1). This exception essentially has two conditions that must be satisfied before it applies. First, petitioner must show that he filed the § 2255 motion within one year from the date that the Supreme Court announced any "newly recognized" rights that are the basis of the motion. Second, petitioner must show that the Supreme Court made these rights "retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review." 28 U.S.C. § 2255(3).

It is undisputed that the Supreme Court decided *Booker* less than one year from the date that petitioner filed the instant § 2255 case. However, the Supreme Court has been silent as to whether *Blakely* or *Booker* apply retroactively. The Ninth Circuit – and all other circuit courts that have considered the question – has held that neither *Blakely* nor *Booker* apply retroactively to cases on collateral review. *See Schardt v. Payne*, 414 F.3d 1025 (9th Cir. 2005); *United States v. Cruz*, 423 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2005). Thus, petitioner fails to satisfy the second prong of the exception and his § 2255 motion is therefore untimely.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, petitioner's motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence is barred by the applicable statute of limitations and should be dismissed. A proposed order is attached to this Report and Recommendation.

DATED this 1st day of August, 2006.

MONICA I BENTON

United States Magistrate Judge

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION Page 4